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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAN A. PARK, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No, 900260-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, this being an appeal from District Court 
convictions, after jury trial, of the defendant of a Class A Misdemeanor and a 
Third Degree Felony, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Was there "probable cause" or "reasonable suspicion" to detain said 
defendant and vehicle after the roadblock stop and were the warrantless searches 
of the defendant and his vehicle unreasonable searches and seizures in violation 
of the Federal and Utah Constitutions and Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 
77-7-15? 
II. Was there voluntary consent given by the occupants of the vehicle to 
search said occupants and vehicle? 
III. Was it proper and correct and within the Trial Court's discretion to 
overrule and deny the Motion to Dismiss at the conclusion of the State's case 
and the Motion for Directed Verdict at the conclusion of the defendant's case 
and to submit the case to the Jury for determination? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
A. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,, 
B. Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
C. Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-7-15. 
D. State and Federal cases as set forth in the arugment section of the 
brief and as set forth in the Table of Authorities 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with Count 1, a Third Degree Felony of knowingly or 
intentionally possessing marijuana, a controlled substance, with intent to 
distribute, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv), and 
with Count 2, a Third Degree Felony of knowingly or intentionally possessing 
methamphetamines, a controlled substance, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence and 
said Motion was overruled and denied by RULING, dated October 17, 1989, a copy 
attached as Appendix A, and defendant was convicted after jury trial held 
January 22, 1990, of a lessor offense, namely, possession of marijuana, a Class 
A Misdemeanor, on Count 1, and of knowingly or intentionally possessing 
methamphetamines, a Third Degree Felony, on Count 2, in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Boyd L. Park, Judge, presiding. Judge Park 
pronounced Judgment and Order of Probation on April 6, 1990, a copy attached as 
Appendix B. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Wednesay, May 10, 1989, the defendant, Dan A. Park, was stopped at a 
roadblock on Interstate 15 at milepost 220, approximately two miles South of 
Nephi, Juab County, Utah (SHT4-6;T22-24)1. The roadblock was conducted 
The Suppression Hearing Transcript has been designated MSHTM and the Trial 
Transcript has been designated "T". 
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subsequent to classroom sessions which were held prior to the roadblock, under 
the supervision of Sargeant Paul Mangelson, of the Utah Highway Patrol, with 
police officers from Pleasant Grove, American Fork, Alpine, Utah County 
Sheriff's Office, Orem City, and Juab County Sheriff's Officers (SHT14;T22). 
The roadblock was being conducted for both the South-bound and the North-bound 
traffic on the freeway, with approximately fifteen officers conducting each of 
the roadblocks. The roadblock was commenced at approximately 6:30 a.m. and was 
discontinued at approximately noon. Defendant was traveling South with two 
passengers and was stopped at the roadblock at approximately 8:15 a.m. on said 
date (T23). Other than the "suspicious" behavior of the occupants at the 
roadblock, the arresting officers had no articulable suspicion or reason to 
believe that the defendant, nor his passengers, were involved in the commission 
of any crime (SHT14-22;T23-25). LuWayne Walker, Deputy Juab County Sheriff, 
after approaching defendant's vehicle, asked for driver's license and 
registration. Deputy Walker asked defendant if the vehicle contained any 
alcohol, firearms or controlled substances. Defendant replied in the negative. 
At that time, the Deputy felt the response was suspicious and not normal 
(T34-36). The Deputy also felt it suspicious because the occupants were not 
making eye contact with him and appeared to be nervous (SHT7,22;T24,36). The 
Deputy, also at that time, detected an unusual odor, similar to tobacco smoke, 
coming from the vehicle (SHT19-20;T22-24,34). The Deputy then asked the 
defendant if a search of the vehicle could be made. Testimony from the Deputy 
was to the effect that the defendant responded in a manner that indicated 
consent to the search of the vehicle (SHT23;T25). Defendant, at the request of 
the Deputy, pulled the vehicle forward and to the right of the highway (T24). 
The Deputy then commenced searching the front and backseat areas of the vehicle 
and found nothing. A pat search of the two passengers in the vehicle found a 
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marijuana pipe and a small amount of marijuana on the person of passenger 
Hewitt. The pat search also found a small amount of marijuana in the coin 
pocket of the other passenger David Park (SHT24;T26). A search of the vehicle 
was continued into the trunk area of the vehicle. A red tool box, which was 
locked with a padlock, was located in the trunk. Sargeant Mangel son found the 
key to the padlock in the trunk area and opened the tool box and found five 
small bags of marijuana plus twenty dollars ($20.00) in U.S. currency 
(SHT24-26;T25~28). All three occupants of the vehicle were then placed under 
arrest for possession with intent to deliver controlled substances. After 
taking the vehicle back to the Juab County Jail area, a further inventory search 
resulted in finding a small package of what appeared to be methamphetamine 
powder under the console area of the vehicle (SHT27-28;T30). No fingerprint 
tests were conducted on the tool box, on its contents, nor in the the interior 
of the tool box nor were fingerprint tests conducted on the small packet of what 
appeared to be illegal drugs found under the console area of the vehicle 
(T62-64). No chemical screening tests were conducted on defendant even though 
he requested a blood test (T71). Testimony at trial was given by passenger 
David Park that the packet of drugs found under the console were his and that 
the tool box belonged to passenger Hewitt (T88-90). Defendant testified at the 
hearing on the Motion to Suppress and at the trial that not e\/ery passenger 
automobile was stopped at the roadblock and that at least two passenger vehicles 
were motioned on through the roadblock at which defendant and the passengers 
were detained while the search was being made (SHT48). 
During the trial defendant moved the Court for an Order of Dismissal and an 
Order Directing the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. The motions were 
denied (T59,98-100). 
- A _ 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was not "probable cause" or "reasonable suspicion" arising out of the 
actions or inactions of defendant or the other occupants of defendant's vehicle 
at the roadblock. Mere failure to look an officer in the eye while responding 
to questions or the odor of something similar to tobacco smoke do not give rise 
to "probable cause" or "reasonable suspicion" needed to detain defendant and/or 
his vehicle. Therefore the warrantless search of the vehicle was an 
unreasonable search in violation of the Federal and Utah Constitutions. 
After being stopped at a roadblock, barring activity or behavior giving 
rise to "probable cause" or "reasonable and articulable suspicion" of criminal 
activity, behavior deemed to give consent to a search of an automobile cannot be 
a voluntary consent. 
The testimony of defendant and one witness to the effect that the marijuana 
and tool box, and the methamphetamines were not defendant's but that the 
contraband was the property of the two passengers plus the failure of the State 
to establish by evidence a sufficient connection between defendant and the 
contraband, were, taken together, sufficient grounds for the Trial Court to 
dismiss or direct a verdict of acquital. The failure of the Trial Court to do 
so was incorrect and an abuse of judicial discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN OR SEIZE 
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE AND THE WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF DEFENDANT AND HIS 
VEHICLE WERE UNREASONABLE AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution both guarantee that an individual has the 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals, 
in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), held that before a vehicle 
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may be stopped, an officer must have an articulable suspicion that an occupant 
of the vehicle has engaged in some criminal wrongdoing. Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 77-7-15, provides that a peace officer may stop any person when he has 
reasonable suspicion to believe the person has commited, is in the act of 
committing, or is attempting to commit a public offense. In the landmark case 
of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1(1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a 
police officer may not act on a hunch, mere speculation, or unparticularized 
suspicion, but only on specific inferences based on facts, in light of the 
officer's experience. The Court, at page 27, intimated that "reasonable 
suspicion" has been characterized as a combination of specific and articulable 
facts together with reasonable inferences from those facts, which, in light of 
the officer's experience, reasonably justify a belief that the person stopped 
has committed, was comitting or was about to commit a crime. 
In State v. Joe, Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 870537-CA (unpublished), 
the Utah Court of Appeals adopted the Prouse doctrine set forth by the United 
States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) wherein the 
Supreme Court held that an arrest was not lawful when it arose out of a 
road-block which was conducted to stop and detain motorists for the purpose of 
checking driver's licenses and registration, absent an articulable and 
reasonable suspicion that the motorist in question was violating the law. In 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989) the Utah Supreme Court held that 
if no arrest has been made, an officer may make a warrantless search of an 
automobile only if there is probable cause for the search. The Court went on to 
state that the actions of the defendant in acting fidgety, turning to the left 
and to the right, and otherwise unusual behavior were not sufficient to give 
rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity. In Schlosser the 
officer had no warrant, no probable cause, and no articulable suspicion that his 
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safety was in danger or that the occupants of the vehicle were engaged in 
criminal activity. The Court held that mere "furtive gestures of an occupant of 
an automobile do not give rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal 
activity". 
Defendant submits that mere failure to look an officer in the eye while 
responding to questions or the odor of something similar to tobacco smoke do not 
give rise to an articulable suspicion or probable cause which is required in 
order to detain defendant and/or his vehicle. 
Defendant further submits that the lack of "probable cause" or a 
"reasonable and articulable suspicion" that a crime had occurred, was in the 
process of occurring, or was about to occur, made the warrantless search of the 
vehicle and its occupants an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the 
Federal and Utah Constitutions. 
POINT II 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT WAS NOT GIVEN BY THE OCCUPANTS OF THE VEHICLE FOR 
THE SEARCH OF SAID VEHICLE. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in addressing the issue of the "voluntariness" of 
a consent to search, has applied a "totality of the circumstances" standard. See 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457 
(Utah App. 1988); and State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Court in Sierra, held that the stopping of an automobile and the 
consequent detention of its occupants is a "seizure" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. Defendant submits that after furnishing proof of driver's 
license, registration, and answering any valid questions of the officers, the 
defendant was entitled to proceed. The mere failure to look at the officer in 
the eye while responding to questions or the odor of something similar to 
tobacco having not given rise to probable cause or reasonable suspicion, 
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therefore making the detainment or "seizure" unlawful. These factors being the 
"totality of the circumstances", the consent, if it was in fact given, was the 
result of "duress or coercion, express or implied". See Arroyo at page 155 and 
Sierra at page 980. Here, in the case at hand, the "consent" was given as a 
result of "duress or coercion, express or implied", and therefore was not, in 
fact, voluntary. Therefore, the search of the vehicle and of the persons of the 
occupants, was not "reasonable" and the evidence seized was not legally 
admissable as evidence. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
AND MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. 
The Testimony of defendant and one witness, his brother, at the Trial, to 
the effect that the marijuana and tool box belonged to the other passenger, and 
that the methamphetamines were the property defendant's brother, the one giving 
testimony, and not of defendant, coupled with the failure of the State to 
establish by other evidence, such as fingerprints, drug screening, e t c , a 
sufficient connection or nexus between defendant and the contraband. The 
statements of defendant and the witness were reasonable explanations as to the 
true owners or possessors of the contraband. Therefore, the State did not 
establish a prima facie case and the Court should have dismissed or directed a 
verdict of acquital by the jury. The Supreme Court of Utah, in State v. Fox, 
709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) held that to find a defendant guilty of possession of a 
drug or other contraband, "it is necessary to prove that there was a sufficient 
nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the accused 
had both the power and the intent to excercise dominion and control over the 
drug"(page 319). The Court went on to state that ownership or occupancy of 
premises where the drugs are found, although important factors, "are not alone 
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sufficient to establish constructive possession, especially when occupancy is 
not exclusive"(page 319). In the case at hand, the State had ample opportunity 
to check for fingerprints upon the container holding the methamphetamines or the 
tool box holding the marijuana. It would have been a simple matter, and \jery 
prudent and reasonable, for the State to have checked each of these containers 
for fingerprints, thereby allowing the State to determine absolutely, and with 
no question, who had handled these containers. 
In order to submit a question to the jury, it is necessary that the State 
present some evidence of eyery element needed to make out a prima facie case. 
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976) and State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568 (Utah 
1985). 
Because the State failed to establish a prima facie case due to its failure 
in establishing a nexus or connection between defendant and the contraband, the 
Trial Court erred in not granting the Motion to Dismiss and/or in submitting the 
case to the jury and not directing a verdict of acquital. 
CONCLUSION 
Because there was no probable cause to detain or seize the vehicle of 
defendant, the unreasonable search and seizure of said vehicle, the lack of 
voluntary consent to the search of said vehicle and the failure of Trial Court 
to dismiss or to direct a verdict of acquital, this case should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of Decembej^iggo. 
LeRay G. OacksOT^^rorney for the 
Defendant cind v(ppel 1 ant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed the original and 8 copies of the foregoing 
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Secretary 
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APPENDIX A 
RULING dated October 17, 1989 denying Motion to Suppress 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) RULING 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NUMBER: 218-D 
-
v
«- ) DATEi OCTOBER 17, 1989 
DAN A. PARK, ) BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
Defendant. ) 
This matter came before the Court on August 1, 1989, on 
defendant's Motion To Suppress Evidence. Plaintiff was 
represented by Donald J, Eyre, Jr., Esq., and defendant was 
represented by ElRay Jackson, Esq. Deputy Juab County Sheriff 
Luwayne Walker and Sergeant Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol 
were sworn and testified. Defendant was sworn and testified, and 
David E. Park, brother of the defendant, was sworn and testified. 
Exhibits #l-#4 were marked and received. The parties requested 
additional time in which to file memorandums in support of their 
respective positions. The Court now having received the 
memorandums from the parties and having read the same, reviewed 
the files and the Court's notes, now makes the following findings 
and ruling: 
FINDINGS 
1. On Wednesday, May 10, 1989, defendant was stopped 
at a roadblock on Interstate 15 at milepost 220, south of Nephi 
in Juab County. 
2. Notice of the roadblock had been published 
approximately two weeks earlier in the Provo Daily Herald and the 
Nephi Times News. The said road block was conducted after 
classroom sessions with officers from Pleasant Grove, American 
Fork, Alpine, Orem, and Utah County and Juab County Sheriff's 
Department. Sergeant Mangelson was the supervising officer, 
together with Sheriff Carter of Juab County. 
3. Approximately thirty officers participated in the 
roadblock as part of the training session. There were fifteen 
officers on each side of the freeway, stopping traffic in both 
directions. The said roadblock was a continuation of the 
training session and was conducted for the purpose of checking 
tfoir dicivora liaontaea, registration, liability insurance, auto 
safety and observations for any violations of the criminal law 
including alcohol and controlled substance abuse. 
4. All of the traffic was stopped in both the north 
and southbound lanes except busses and tractor trailers. 
Defendant alleges that some automobiles were not stopped but were 
waived through, and believes that he has a. memory of at least two 
such automobiles. The other witnesses either denied this or did 
not observe any automobiles that were waived through. The Court 
finds that all automobile and light truck traffic were stopped. 
5. Three to four signs were set up in each direction 
giving notice of the roadblock. The signs were spaced out over a 
distance of one half mile to one mile from the point of stopping. 
6. Defendant was driving his vehicle south with two 
passengers when he was stopped at the roadblock. 
7. Deputy Walker first approached defendant's vehicle. 
Defendant acted nervous and unusual and he and the passengers in 
the vehicle would not make eye contact with Deputy Walker. 
Deputy Walker asked defendant if he had any alcohol, guns or 
drugs in the vehicle and defendant responded "no". Deputy Walker 
could smell an odor coming from the vehicle which he termed 
unusual but similar to tobacco smoke. Deputy Walker asked 
defendant if he could search the vehicle and defendant consented 
and drove the vehicle to the side of the roadway, where the 
defendant and the two passengers exited the vehicle. 
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13. Regarding issue number one. The appellate courts 
of the State of Utah have not squarely addressed the issue of 
roadblocks in the State of Utah. The only authority is The State 
Of Utah vs. Timothy Joe, case number 870537, filed September 20, 
1988. The Court in that case cited Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648 (1979), holding a violation of the fourth amendment occurs 
when police detain a motorist to check driver's license and 
registration without, . ."articulable and reasonable suspicion 
the motorist is unlicensed, the automobile is not regiotered, or 
that the vehicle or occupant may be seized for a violation of 
law." However, the Supreme Court as dicta in the Prouse case 
stated as followsi 
"This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware 
or other states (sic) from developing methods of spot 
checks and involve less intrusion or that do not 
involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. 
Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock type 
stops is one possible alternative. We hold only that 
persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for 
that reason alone have their travel and privacy 
interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police 
officers." 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the Timothy Joe case 
declined to further examine the legality of roadblocks, but did 
say: 
"One clear requirement is that there can be no 
arbitrariness in determining whom will be stopped at 
the roadblock. They may stop all traffic, or they may 
use other neutral formulae such as determining every 
fifth or tenth vehicle." 
The facts in Timothy Joe were that two vehicles 
immediately preceding the defendant were allowed to pass through 
the blockade without being detained, resulting in what appears to 
be unbridled discretion of police officers, and thus violative of 
defendant's fourth amendment rights against unreasonable seizure. 
Since the Prouse case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the District Of Columbia in the case of The United States of 
America v, Gregory McFadden, was presented the same issue as is 
before this Court. Citing the Prouse case for the concept of 
stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a 
seizure within the meaning of the fourth and fourteenth 
amendments even though the stop is limited and resulting 
detention quite brief. The Court in McFaddin emphasized that 
"such seizures are unconstitutional, however, only if they are 
unreasonable." The Court went on to say that "in determining the 
reasonableness of the seizure a court must balance the gravity of 
uhw public aonaerna osrvad by the seizure, the degree to which 
the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the 
interference with individual liberty." The Court further stated 
. . ."a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts 
indicating that society's legitimate interests require the 
seizure of the particular individual or . . . the seizure must be 
carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit neutral 
limitations on the conduct of individual officers." 
The Court in McFaddin also cited United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, (1976), where the Supreme Court 
upheld the stopping of motor vehicles on a highway near Mexico 
for brief questions to determine whether illegal aliens were 
present. Knowing that the checkpoint where all vehicles were 
stopped was permanent and the degree of detention consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant. The regular 
manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible 
evidence, reassuring to law abiding motorists that the stops are 
duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. Other 
authorities were cited where automobile roadblocks "passed 
constitutional muster, " as follows: automobile roadblocks held 
in a clearly visible checkpoint where all vehicles were inspected 
for illegal aliens, driver's license, vehicle registration, and 
proof of insurance where the roadblock was established in a 
systematic manner to stop vehicles in a pattern which protected 
the public from the officers unbridled discretion. The Court 
went on to state that "a roving police stop is a more serious 
intrusion than a predicted checkpoint inspection, because the 
unexpected stop is pregnant with great annoyance and 
inconvenience, and more likely to frighten or embarrass." 
The Circuit Court of Appeals again in the McFaddln case 
in sustaining the roadblock emphasized that the roadblock was to 
regulate vehicular traffic by allowing the check of driver's 
license and vehicle registrations. That the side effect of 
deterring drug sellers trafficking in areas where the roadblock 
w*«- i»uuiiucj c'lid not runctui? the blookade unlawful. 
There now exists a history of escalating drug traffic 
along the stretch of Interstate 15 where the roadblock in this 
case was conducted. There have been numerous arrests for drug 
violations in this area, and this tends to legitimize the public 
interest in predetermined checkpoints, systematically pursued by 
officers to minimize the burden to individual citizens without 
discretion to engage in random roving stops. 
With regard to issue number one, this Court concludes 
that the roadblock in question was so planned and executed as to 
render the inconvenience to the travelling public to be minimal 
and so structured to neutralize the officers conducting the 
roadblock to a minimal intrusion on the travelling public's time 
and inconvenience. Thus the stop of the defendant's vehicle at 
the roadblock was a reasonable seizure, not violating defendant's 
federal fourth amendments rights or the defendant's rights under 
Article One, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution. 
14. Regarding issue number two, the facts in this case 
indicate that the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of 
his vehicle by the officers involved in the roadblock. This was 
not a case of mere "nervous behavior" in that Deputy Walker not 
only noticed that the defendant and his passengers would not make 
eye contact and that the defendant's conduct was unusual, but 
that he also smelled an unusual odor in the vehicle similar to 
that of tobacco smoke. Officer Mangelson who approached the 
vehicle as it pulled to the side of the road immediately noticed 
an impairment with the defendant and a smell of marijuana coming 
from the automobile. There is no testimony to the effect that 
the defendant was coerced or gave his consent to the search of 
the vehicle under duress, Further, a pat-down search of the two 
passengers in the vehicle resulted in the finding of marijuana on 
both of the passengers would create sufficient probable cause in 
the minds of the officers who believed there may be additional 
marijuana located in the vehicle. 
*n Carol vs. United Btatea, 267 U,8. X32, the Coutft nt»u 
delineated two general standards for dispensing with the need to 
obtain a warrant when probable cause was present regarding the 
vehicles. The first is the mobility of the vehicle and the 
second the impracticality of obtaining a search warrant under the 
circumstances. 
Further, in the case of United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798 (1982), the Court applied the Carol rule and found that where 
police officers had a probable cause to believe that a trunk of a 
vehicle contained narcotics that the resulting search of the 
trunk and a subsequent search of the zippered leather pouch in 
the trunk in which was located cash and narcotics was determined 
to be a lawful search. The Court further concluded that an 
automobile search could go beyond the search and seizure of the 
vehicle and could include containers in the vehicle based on 
probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband and 
that the container was capable of containing the contraband. 
The Court concludes that the warrantless search of the 
defendant's vehicle was not an unreasonable search and seizure in 
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights under the 
Federal and Utah Constitutions. 
15. Regarding issue number three. The Court having 
concluded that the roadblock in the instance case was lawful and 
that the warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle was not a 
violation of the defendant's Federal and Utah Constitutional 
rights, the Court finds that the officers request to search 
defendant's vehicle was not an invasion of the defendant's 
Constitutional rights to privacy and right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure. Deputy Walker in this case, 
after .having made a lawful roadblock stop had probable cause to 
believe that there was a criminal violation, from the conduct of 
the defendant and the passengers, from the unusual smell 
emanating from the vehicle, and from Officer Mangelson's smelling 
of marijuana and the observation of the defendant's apparent 
impairment which was consistent with drug or alcohol use. 
This Court concludes that Deputy Walker's request to 
search defendant's vehicle was not an invasion of the defendant's 
Federal or State Constitutional rights to privacy or right to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure. 
RULING 
The Court having concluded that all of the actions the 
officers were legal and lawful and that the contraband obtained 
is admissible evidence in prosecution for controlled substance 
violations, the motion of the defendant to suppress the evidence 
in this case is denied. The Court will set this matter for jury 
trial in Nephi, Juab County, Utah, on November 21, 1989 at 1:00 
p.m. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this 17th day of October, 1989. 
^~-BY-TH£ COURTS— 
V ^BOYEfL. PARK, JUDGE 
cc: Donald J. Eyre, Jr. 
LeRay G. Jackson 
APPENDIX B 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF PROBATION dated April 6, 1990 
C'^ rtC o! DUlrlct Court, Juab County 
F I L K D 
APR 1 0 1 9 9 0 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Pat P. Greenwood.Clerk.-—Deputy 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * 
THE STATE OF UTAH, MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER: 218-D 
~va~ DATE? April 6, 1990 
DAN A. PARK, BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
Defendant. Rpt. by Richard C. Tatton, CSR 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF PROBATION 
This matter came before the Court for pronouncement of 
judgment on the above-named defendant on a charge of Ct. I -
Possession of Marijuana, a Class A Misdemeanor, and Ct. II -
Knowingly or Intentionally Possessiong Methamphetamines, a 
third degree felony. Juab County Attorney Don Eyre appeared 
for and on behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant appeared 
in person and through attorney LeRay Jackson. 
On the 22nd day of January, 1990, the defendant was 
found guilty of the above stated crimes and the matter was 
referred to the Adult Probation and Parole Department for a 
presentence investigation and report. Their report has now 
been received and considered by the Court and defendant's 
counsel has been made aware of the recommendation. 
Mr. Jackson addressed the Court regarding the 
recommendation. He stated that he felt that the six months 
jail time recommended was harsh. Mr. Eyre stated that he 
concurred with the recommendation. The defendant then 
addressed the Court on his own behalf. 
There being no legal reason having been shown why 
sentence should not be pronounced, it is the judgment of the 
Court that the defendant be sentenced on Count I - to the Juab 
County Jail for a terra not to exceed one year, and on Count II 
- to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years• The sentences are to run concurrent* 
Execution of the sentences are suspended and the defendant is 
placed on probation for a period of thirty-six (3 6) months upon 
the following terms and conditions: 
It Defendant enter into an agreement with the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department and comply 
strictly with the terms of probation. 
2. Defendant make himself/herself available to the 
Department and the Court when requested to do so, 
3. Defendant is not to violate the laws of the 
United States, State of Utah, or any municipality 
wherein he/she may reside, 
4. The defendant is to serve three months in the 
Juab County Jail with credit given for the time 
that he has already served (three days). After 
the defendant has served the first thirty days of 
his jail term, he is granted work release if he 
can find a job in Juab County. 
5. The defendant is to pay a fine in the amount of 
$500.00 for Count II, and a fine in the amount of 
$200.00 for Count I. 
6. The defendant is to pay $50.00 to the Victim 
Reparation Fund on Count I, and pay $125.00 to 
the Victim Reparation Fund on Count II. 
7. The defendant is ordered to enter and complete 
any treatment programs deemed appropriate by his 
probation officer. 
8. The defendant is ordered to pay $150.00 to the 
Substance Abuse Prevention Account. 
9. The defendant is ordered to submit his person, 
auto, place of residence or any property under 
his control to search by his probation officer. 
10. The defendant is to submit to drug testing at the 
request of his probation officer. 
11. The defendant is not to use any non-prescribed 
controlled substances or paraphernalia. 
12. The defendant is not to frequent places where 
drugs are used or sold; the defendant is not to 
associate with persons known to use 
non-prescribed controlled substances. 
13. The defendant is not to obtain prescriptions for 
controlled substances without prior knowledge of 
his probation officer. 
14• The defendant is to report to the Juab County 
Jail no later than April 9, 1990 at the hour of 
8:00 a.m* to commence his jail term. 
Court retains jurisdiction to make further orders as 
necessary• 
Dated this 6th day of April, 1990. 
